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Introduction: One of the chief intellectual discoveries of the past four years has been the degree to 
which government rests on norms: on a shared sense of the proper way to go about the business of 
government. This is unsurprising for followers of the law and society movement, with which the Baldy 
Center is so closely associated. From the beginning, scholars of law and society have demonstrated the 
limits of formalism in explaining how the law actually works. One can think of the Trump presidency as 
finally demonstrating for the wider world of legal scholars, the essential role of shared understandings, 
legal culture, accepted practice, informal conventions, and customs in our separation of powers. The 
judge-made doctrine has changed only at the margins, and its major holdings remain intact, but the real 
meaning of separation of powers has been altered dramatically. 
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One of the chief intellectual discoveries of the past four years has been the degree to which government 
rests on norms: on a shared sense of the proper way to go about the business of government. This is 
unsurprising for followers of the law and society movement, with which the Baldy Center is so closely 
associated. From the beginning, scholars of law and society have demonstrated the limits of formalism in 
explaining how the law actually works. One can think of the Trump presidency as finally demonstrating 
for the wider world of legal scholars, the essential role of shared understandings, legal culture, accepted 
practice, informal conventions, and customs in our separation of powers. The judge-made doctrine has 
changed only at the margins, and its major holdings remain intact, but the real meaning of separation of 
powers has been altered dramatically. 
When we think of separation of powers, we usually think of judicial doctrines that are designed to keep 
each branch within its proper limits, but as the new focus on norms shows, separation of powers is also 
about how each branch works on its own. If a branch can’t do what it was formally designed to do 
because of a breakdown in norms, then there will be pressure for that function to appear elsewhere in 
the constitutional system. One can view the administrative state this way: in the nineteenth century, as 
Professor Blackhawk has shown, Congress could not carry out the administrative functions it was 
originally assigned through the petition process and through appropriations. [1] There was little 
sustained political will to try to make changes to keep those administrative functions in Congress. So, in 
1946, the petition process was essentially eliminated and Congress’ administrative functions were 
transferred to the executive branch.  
It’s worth trying to generalize this account to see what other stories we could tell. One might offer a 
similar story about Congress’ foreign policy functions, many of which were transferred to the President 
in a series of delegations beginning in the 1930s and 40s concerning trade and the use of armed force. 
One could tell such a story about congressional control over and supervision of the government. 
Congress’ impeachment function has rarely if ever, worked on the presidency, because the hold of elites 
on the office was broken in the early 19th century, and a party system was created to nominate 
presidential candidates whose parties divided precisely on the norms that should govern conduct in 
office. The impeachment function was replaced, in part, by judicial processes—criminal investigations, 
usually—whose scope was hemmed in by a variety of judicial doctrines, principally the doctrines of 
executive privilege and executive immunity. In recent years the doctrine of standing has been recruited 
to assist in limiting judicial processes to enforce the law against the President or high-ranking executive 
officials. 
I wonder whether we could say the same thing of the legislative function, that is, of Congress’ power to 
make law by passing bills and submitting them to the President for signature. Just like Congress’ 
administrative functions, just like its foreign policy functions, just like its impeachment and oversight 
functions, the legislative function requires norms to work. If those norms are abandoned or prove 
unsustainable, then it will be impossible to use the legislative function to solve the problems that 
demand a national solution. The unemployment crisis triggered by the Coronavirus might fit here. Are 
the norms surrounding the legislative function breaking down? Recently an old article by John Murrin 
has been coming to mind, titled, "A Roof without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity." 
The basis thesis of that article, as I recall, was that there was not, at the time of the founding, a national 
political culture sufficient to sustain the operation of a robust national government. The American 
government was a roof without the walls of a shared culture to sustain it. What formed in its place was a 
veneration of the Constitution and the ongoing project of constitution-making. Today I am tempted to 
conclude that whatever shared, national political culture we were able to create has lapsed. Without any 
tissue connecting members of Congress, it seems unlikely for them to be able to work with one another 
in any of the ways necessary to sustain a successful exercise of the legislative function. A usable national 
legislative function is an accomplishment of political culture. Since we lack the culture necessary to 
sustain it, we should expect replacements to arise elsewhere in the system. 
 
